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FROM RAILROADS TO SAND DUNES:  
AN EXAMINATION OF THE OFFSETTING 
DOCTRINE IN PARTIAL TAKINGS 
Louis M. Russo* 
 
Called “shadowy at best,” the offsetting doctrine in partial takings has 
confused “even trained legal minds” and generated inconsistent decision 
after inconsistent decision.  The offsetting doctrine allows certain benefits, 
termed special, to offset condemnation awards, while general benefits may 
not be offset.  Courts blindly adhere to the doctrine despite its 
underpinnings rooted in eighteenth-century public policy, which was based 
on concerns of overly speculative valuation and arguably erroneous 
fairness, as well as incorrect interpretations of Takings Clause 
jurisprudence.  Such adherence dramatically increases the cost of financing 
a takings project. 
In the face of blind adherence to the doctrine, municipalities are forced 
to balance the needs of their citizens against the needs of eighteenth-
century courts, often resulting in the failure of municipalities to engage in 
takings for the public benefit.  This Note argues that new public policy 
concerns warrant rejection of the doctrine in favor of a rule that allows all 
nonspeculative benefits to offset a condemnation award.  This rule would 
take into account modern advances in evidence, promote fairness, simplify 
the judicial process, and allow municipalities to respond to twentieth-
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine for just a moment that you are the mayor of a coastal city that 
was just ravaged by the devastating effects of a major hurricane.1  Climate 
scientists tell you that such storms will become more prevalent, and 
although you are unsure of the science, you decide that action must be 
taken.2 
After consulting with scientists, engineers, and city planners, you decide 
that the most prudent course of action is to build sand dunes.3  Sand dunes 
are often considered a first line of defense against coastal flooding.4  
Unfortunately, private landowners, who cherish their views of the usually 
peaceful Atlantic, own most of the beachfront land in your city. 
You consult with a city attorney, who counsels that you may use the 
power of eminent domain to take a portion of the landowner’s property, so 
long as you provide “just compensation.”5  Delighted, you respond that this 
should not be a problem—after all, the owners will receive implicit 
compensation in the form of protection from further storms, right?  Maybe.  
The homeowners will almost certainly argue that they must be financially 
compensated—that is,monetarily—and that it is unjust to force them to bear 
the costs of a project that the entire community benefits from. 
Determining who is correct hinges on a body of law where “[c]onfusion 
abounds.”6  That body of law, the subject of this Note, is the offsetting 
doctrine in partial takings.7 
This scenario bears much similarity to the facts that were before the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey in Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan.8  
Harvey Cedars, a municipality on Long Beach Island in New Jersey, 
exercised the power of eminent domain to facilitate a dune construction 
project that restored beaches, protecting residents from erosion and storms.9  
 
 1. It is estimated that Hurricane Sandy caused $19 billion worth of damage to New 
York City alone. Eric S. Blake et al., Tropical Cyclone Report Hurricane Sandy, NAT’L 
HURRICANE CTR. 18 (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL182012 
_Sandy.pdf. 
 2. Scientists disagree about the increased likelihood of major tropical storms in the 
mid-Atlantic region. Compare THOMAS C. PETERSON ET AL., EXPLAINING EXTREME EVENTS 
OF 2012 FROM A CLIMATE PERSPECTIVE S20 (2013) (suggesting “increased frequency of 
Sandy-like inundation disasters in the coming decades along the mid-Atlantic and 
elsewhere”), with Elizabeth A. Barnes et al., Model Projections of Atmospheric Steering of 
Sandy-Like Superstorms, 110 PNAS 15,211–215 (2013) (noting that “climate models 
consistently project a decrease in the frequency and persistence of the westward flow that led 
to Sandy’s unprecedented track”). 
 3. Sand dunes protected properties in New York and New Jersey from flooding during 
Hurricane Sandy. See Mireya Navarro & Rachel Nuwer, Resisted for Blocking the View, 
Dunes Prove They Blunt Storms, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2012, at A1. 
 4. Sand Dunes, FEMA (Sept. 4, 2013, 5:04 AM), http://www.fema.gov/floodplain-
management/sand-dunes. 
 5. For a basic discussion of the power of eminent domain, see infra Part I.A. 
 6. 8A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § G16.04 (Matthew Bender 
3d ed. 2013). 
 7. Id. 
 8. 70 A.3d 524 (N.J. 2013). 
 9. Id. at 526. 
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The municipality acquired an easement on the Karans’ property, but the 
Karans rejected an eminent domain award issued by three appointed 
commissioners and demanded a jury trial on the issue of compensation.10 
At a preliminary hearing, the trial court needed to determine if the 
borough could present evidence to the jury that “[w]ithout the dune project, 
the Karans’ property had only a 27 [percent] chance of surviving fifty years 
without any storm damage.”11  The lower court determined that the benefit 
of the storm-protection project was “shared . . . by the larger community,” 
or put differently, a “general benefit.”12 
By classifying the benefits of the project as general, the trial court 
determined that New Jersey’s “traditional offsetting doctrine”13 prohibited 
the jury from reducing, or offsetting, the eminent domain award; only 
special benefits could offset an award.14  Thus, Harvey Cedars was 
precluded from introducing any evidence concerning the protection 
provided by the sand dunes.  At trial, the Karans received a jury award of 
$375,000.15  Harvey Cedars appealed, and the case made its way to the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey.16 
On appeal, the New Jersey high court was tasked with determining “how 
to calculate ‘just compensation’ when the taking of a portion of . . . property 
. . . enhance[d] in part the value of the remaining property.”17  The court 
could have:  (1) reaffirmed the application of the traditional offsetting 
doctrine, upholding the ruling of the trial court; (2) maintained the 
traditional offsetting doctrine but characterized the dune project as creating 
a special benefit;18 (3) eliminated offsetting entirely; or (4) allowed the 
offsetting of all nonspeculative benefits—the course the court ultimately 
took.19 
This Note examines the merits of each of the routes that New Jersey 
could have taken and other states can take regarding the calculation of just 
compensation in partial takings cases.  It pays particular attention to the 
justifications for maintaining a distinction between general and special 
benefits and the counter-justifications for permitting the offsetting of any 
benefit.  Part I provides an overview of the law of eminent domain in the 
United States and introduces the basic concepts and justifications of the 
offsetting doctrine.  Part II discusses the constitutionality of offsetting.  
Part III examines the conflict between states that maintain a distinction 
 
 10. Id. at 528. 
 11. Id. at 529. 
 12. Id. 
 13. E.H. Schopflocher, Annotation, Deduction of Benefits in Determining Compensation 
or Damages in Eminent Domain, 145 A.L.R. 7, 40 (1943) (“The principal rule, for purposes 
of the distinction between deductible and nondeductible benefits, is that general benefits 
cannot be deducted, but that special benefits are deductible.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 14. See Karan, 70 A.3d at 529–30.  The trial judge relied on Sullivan v. North Hudson 
County Railroad Co., 18 A. 689 (N.J. 1889). 
 15. Karan, 70 A.3d at 531. 
 16. Id. at 532. 
 17. Id. at 526. 
 18. The borough argued for this approach. See id. at 532. 
 19. Id. at 543–44. 
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between general and special benefits and states that do not.  Lastly, Part IV 
contends that the arguments for maintaining a distinction between general 
and special benefits do not provide a persuasive justification for the 
traditional offsetting doctrine. 
I.   THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
Part I provides a broad overview of key concepts in eminent domain and 
introduces the offsetting doctrine.  Part I.A considers the source of eminent 
domain power, the constitutional limitations on the exercise of eminent 
domain power, and the authority to delegate eminent domain power.  
Part I.B provides a brief overview of the condemnation process, principally 
under the Uniform Eminent Domain Code.  Part I.C explores the concept of 
a giving and discusses how benefits are treated when an entire property is 
taken.  Part I.D introduces the concept of a partial taking and explores the 
methods that courts use to calculate just compensation in partial takings 
cases.  Part I.E introduces the offsetting doctrine, defines general and 
special benefits, and discusses the justifications for the offsetting doctrine.  
Part I.F discusses the historical context of the offsetting doctrine.  Part I.G 
discusses the modern need to offset and the evidence used in contemporary 
condemnation cases. Lastly, Part I.H discusses special assessment taxes in 
the context of partial condemnation. 
A.   The Source of the Power of Eminent Domain 
This section discusses the power of eminent domain.  It begins by 
discussing the historical roots of eminent domain, and it then analyzes 
eminent domain under the federal and state constitutions.  Finally, this 
section examines the authority to delegate eminent domain to local 
governments, public service corporations, private corporations, and 
individuals. 
1.   Historical Roots of the Eminent Domain 
As put by a leading real property treatise: “‘Eminent Domain’ is the 
power of the sovereign to take private property for the public use without 
the owner’s consent.”20  Some scholars have argued that the power of 
eminent domain is as old as the Bible,21 and the historical record reveals at 
least some power to compel an individual to relinquish his property under 
Roman law.22  However, the legal framework that surrounds the modern 
exercise of eminent domain in the United States is not rooted in ancient 
 
 20. 4 HERBERT T. TIFFANY & BASIL JONES, TIFFANY REAL PROPERTY § 1252 (3d ed. 
2014) (citing United States v. 0.95 Acres of Land, 994 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1993)) (emphasis 
added). 
 21. 1 SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 1.2[1] (noting that a jurist “claimed that the earliest 
known exercise of the power of eminent domain was alluded to in the Bible”). 
 22. For an excellent discussion of the exercise of eminent domain under Roman law, see 
J. Walter Jones, Expropriation in Roman Law, 45 L.Q. REV. 512 (1929).  Additionally, the 
leading authority on the historical development of eminent domain is William B. Stoebuck, 
A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553 (1972). 
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law23 but instead finds at least some of its theoretical underpinnings in early 
English law.24  William Blackstone’s conceptualization of the power of 
eminent domain as the ability to “oblige the owner to alienate his 
possessions for a reasonable price” still holds true today.25  Despite these 
theoretical underpinnings, American eminent domain law was largely 
developed in the American colonies.26  Early colonial statutes provided that 
land owners were to receive “due satisfaction,” “due justification,” or “true 
[v]alue].”27 
2.   Eminent Domain Under the Fifth Amendment 
At the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, it was effectively assumed 
that sovereign governments, including the federal government, maintained 
the power of eminent domain.28  This power is limited by the Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause, which states that property shall not “be taken 
for public use, without just compensation.”29 
In a recent case, Kelo v. City of New London,30 the U.S. Supreme Court 
adopted a broad interpretation of the public use requirement, permitting a 
taking for a “public purpose”—including privately owned economic 
development.31  After Kelo, sovereigns vested with the power of eminent 
domain have broad powers to take private property, at least under the 
Constitution, so long as there is “sufficient indicia of meeting public 
use/public purpose requirements.”32   
 
 23. Nathan Matthews, The Valuation of Property in the Roman Law, 34 HARV. L. REV. 
229, 230 (1921) (noting that “[t]he law of valuation, as applied by the American and English 
courts . . . has no roots in [Roman law]”). 
 24. See Stoebuck, supra note 22, at 554, 561–67 (discussing the influential role in the 
development of eminent domain shared by the Magna Carta, English statutes, and the 
writings of Lord Coke, Blackstone, and John Locke).  Significantly, a number of chapters of 
the Magna Carta foreshadow the modern conception of the power of eminent domain.  For 
example, Chapter 39 provides that “[n]o freemen shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or 
exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the 
lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.” MAGNA CARTA, CH. 39 (1225).  
Additionally, Chapter 28 provides that “[n]o constable or other bailiff of ours shall take corn 
or other provisions from anyone without immediately tendering money therefore . . . .” Id. at 
CH. 28.  For a thorough discussion of the provisions of the Magna Carta that are relevant to 
the power of eminent domain, see KYLE SCOTT, THE PRICE OF POLITICS:  LESSONS FROM 
KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON 1–17 (2010). 
 25. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *135. 
 26. See generally James W. Ely, Jr., That Due Satisfaction May Be Made:  The Fifth 
Amendment and the Origins of the Compensation Principle, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (1992).  
 27. Id. at 8–11. 
 28. 13 RICHARD J. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79F.01 (Michael Allan Wolf, 
ed., Matthew Bender 2013) (noting that the Fifth Amendment “assumes that a governmental 
power to take private property exists”).  Despite this assumption, the U.S. Supreme Court did 
not officially recognize the power of the federal government to take property until 1875. 
Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875). 
 29. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 30. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 31. See id. at 484–86. 
 32. 2A SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 7.09[2]. 
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This broad conception of “public use” is tempered by the second 
constitutional requirement—just compensation.33  Just compensation, 
which is the primary issue under the offsetting doctrine,34 at its most 
general level requires the payment of fair market value.35  The Supreme 
Court has generally required that this value be determined at the “highest 
and most profitable use for which the land is likely to be needed in the 
reasonably near future.”36 
3.   Eminent Domain Under State Constitutions 
In addition to the U.S. Constitution, forty-nine states have an eminent 
domain provision in their state constitutions.37  Despite often using near 
identical language,38 states are free to interpret their constitutions as 
providing greater protection to private property.39  As a result, eminent 
domain cases “brought under a state constitutional provision may require a 
different analysis and lead to different results.”40  This is especially true in 
the realm of partial takings and the offsetting doctrine because states 
frequently disagree about the classification of benefits as general or 
special.41 
4.   Delegation of the Power of Eminent Domain 
Although the eminent domain power is originally vested in the federal 
and state governments, it is unquestioned that this power can be delegated 
to local governments,42 public service corporations,43 private 
corporations,44 and even individuals.45  Once eminent domain power is 
 
 33. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 497 (acknowledging the second requirement of just 
compensation). 
 34. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 35. See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943) (noting that landowners are 
entitled to fair market value). 
 36. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934). 
 37. 1 SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 1.3.  North Carolina is the only state without an eminent 
domain provision. See id. 
 38. For example, the Washington Constitution provides that “[p]rivate property shall not 
be taken for private use . . . .  No private property shall be taken or damaged for public or 
private use without just compensation having been first made.”  WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16. 
 39. See, e.g., Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. v. State, 13 P.3d 183, 189 (Wash. 2000) 
(“Washington state courts . . . provide Washington citizens with enhanced protections 
against taking private property for private use.”). 
 40. 1 SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 1.3. 
 41. Compare Blankenburg v. City of Northfield, 462 N.W.2d 417, 418 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1990) (finding that a connection to a public sewer is a special benefit), with City of Wichita 
v. May’s Co., 510 P.2d 184, 187–88 (Kan. 1973) (concluding that the building of a sewer 
line confers no special benefit). 
 42. See, e.g., State v. Mayor of Newark, 23 A. 129, 129 (N.J. 1891) (noting the authority 
to delegate eminent domain power to a city). 
 43. See, e.g., N.C. Pub. Serv. Co. v. S. Power Co., 282 F. 837, 841 (4th Cir. 1922) (“The 
right of eminent domain is conferred by statute on electric power and light companies.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Gradison v. Ohio Oil Co., 156 N.E.2d 80, 82 (Ind. 1959) (permitting the 
affirmative grant of eminent domain power to both domestic and foreign corporations). 
 45. See, e.g., United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land, 43 F. Supp. 561, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 
1942) (“Congress may properly delegate to individuals . . . [the] power to condemn.”). 
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granted, judicial review of the grantees’ authority is limited to whether they 
complied with the public use and just compensation restrictions.46  In other 
words, when the power of eminent domain is exercised by a grantee or the 
state itself, the scope of judicial review does not reach questions like 
whether the project is necessary or prudent.47 
The delegation of eminent domain power to railroads played an 
extremely important role in their development.48  Legislatures and courts 
were apprehensive about granting the power of eminent domain to 
railroads.49  As a result of this apprehension, eighteenth-century state 
supreme courts developed a variety of protective doctrines,50including the 
offsetting doctrine.51 
B.   Eminent Domain Explored:  The Condemnation Process 
Each state and the federal government have procedures to exercise the 
power of eminent domain—or in other words, condemn the land.52  The 
particular procedures vary “widely in different jurisdictions.”53 
At a general level, when an entity desires to exercise the power of 
eminent domain, there are two questions:  the validity of the taking and the 
calculation of just compensation.54  The apparatus to answer these questions 
can be either administrative or judicial.55 
The administrative approach typically consists of a vote on an ordinance 
or resolution to take a certain property.56  Concurrent with this vote is an 
“award . . . of compensation to each individual whose land is taken.”57  If 
the landowners wish to challenge the award of compensation, they must 
institute a challenge, which would be tried before a jury or judge like any 
other action at common law.58 
Under the judicial approach, when an entity invested with the power of 
eminent domain wants to exercise that power, “it institutes a suit or 
proceeding in court against the persons whose land it desires to take.”59  In 
that proceeding, the judicial body will first determine if the entity has the 
 
 46. 1A SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 3.03[3][c]. 
 47. See id. 
 48. CHRISTIAN WOLMAR, THE GREAT RAILROAD REVOLUTION:  THE HISTORY OF TRAINS 
IN AMERICA 26 (2012) (noting that eminent domain power was crucial for railroads). 
 49. See id. at 26–27 (noting the battles and the “uphill struggle” railroads faced in 
persuading legislatures and courts to grant and uphold the power of eminent domain 
executed by railroads). 
 50. WILLIAM A FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS:  LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 81 
(1995). 
 51. For a discussion of the role railroads played in the development of the offsetting 
doctrine, see infra notes 120–26 and accompanying text. 
 52. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 353 (10th ed. 2014). 
 53. 6 SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 24.01[1]. 
 54. Id. § 24.01[2]. 
 55. Id. § 24.02. 
 56. See id. § 24.04. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. 
 59. Id. § 24.05[1]. 
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power to condemn.60  This is ordinarily a question of law determined at a 
hearing.61  If the entity is determined to have the power to condemn, a 
proceeding will be held to determine the value of just compensation.62 
Under either approach, judicial or administrative, once the amount of 
compensation has been challenged and the parties end up in court, a jury 
will likely be presented with evidence concerning the value of the property 
that is the subject of the action.63  Litigation concerning the offsetting 
doctrine typically arises when appealing the admissibility of particular 
evidence—like testimony regarding the value of a general or special 
benefit.64 
C.   Givings and the Treatment of Benefits During a Total Taking 
When an entire property is taken, the government must compensate the 
property owner for the value.65  However, the effect of any taking will 
almost always benefit neighboring property owners.66  For example, if a 
municipality condemns tall buildings along the shore, neighboring property 
owners will receive a benefit—a view of the ocean.67  Commentators call 
this benefit a giving.68  The law does not recognize givings, however, and 
recipients are not “charged” for the benefits.69  In the above example, the 
neighboring property owners will not have to pay the government for their 
new view.70 
The concept of a giving has played an important role in increased coastal 
floodplain development.71  Professor Daniel D. Barnhizer argues that 
government givings, including the construction of flood control measures, 
have increased coastal property values.72  Professor Barnhizer argues that 
public policy necessitates a change in the law that would permit the 
government to offset these “givings” to finance property acquisition 
programs to remove landowners from coastal areas.73 
 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. For a discussion of the presentation of valuation evidence to juries, see 7 SACKMAN, 
supra note 6, § G3.01–.12. 
 64. See, e.g., Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 544 (N.J. 2013) 
(ordering a new trial because the condemning entity was “barred from presenting evidence 
that is admissible”). 
 65. See supra notes 27–39 and accompanying text. 
 66. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 549–50 
(2001) (discussing that givings occur “in almost every . . . government endeavor related to 
property”). 
 67. For a similar example, in the context of rezoning ordinance, see id. at 566. 
 68. See id. at 550–51. 
 69. See id. at 564 (“Currently, givings are not a recognized category of law.”). 
 70. See id. 
 71. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Givings Recapture:  Funding Public Acquisition of Private 
Property Interests on the Coasts, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 295, 295 (2003). 
 72. See id. at 296–97. 
 73. See id. at 298. 
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It is important to note that the recipients of these “givings” are the 
property owners whose lands are not taken.74  In fact, when an entire 
property is taken, the general rule is that landowners are not to be 
compensated for the “effect of the proposed project upon the value of 
property taken.”75  The Supreme Court has held that under the Fifth 
Amendment, landowners are not entitled to receive an increased 
condemnation award because of the prior likelihood that the land would be 
taken.76 
D.   An Introduction to Partial Takings 
A partial taking, in contrast with a total taking, occurs when only a 
portion of land is taken or damaged by the government or entity 
condemning the land.77  Partial takings cases present “far more complex 
[issues] than total takings,” because the property owner “not only 
experiences a loss of a portion of his or her property but also suffers 
damage to the portion not taken,” and indeed can receive a benefit to his 
retained land from the project undertaken on the condemned land.78 
To calculate just compensation in partial takings cases, courts apply one 
of two approaches—the “before and after” rule or the “severance damage” 
rule.79  The before and after rule, which is used in the overwhelming 
majority of jurisdictions,80 “compares the fair market value of the entire 
tract of land before the taking with the fair market value of the land 
remaining after the taking.”81  Under the severance damage rule, the market 
value of property condemned is calculated, and then additional “damages” 
are calculated to determine what “the landowner is entitled to receive.”82 
Each of these formulas presupposes that the remaining property will 
decrease in value, but the complexities of partial takings cases arise when 
courts need to determine how the remaining property may increase in value 
or how the diminishment in value may be reduced as a result of the 
taking.83 
 
 74. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 66, at 552 (noting that the state takes from 
“Jane Smith” and gives to everyone). 
 75. See 4 SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 12.03. 
 76. See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 377–78 (1943) (citing Shoemaker v. 
United States, 147 U.S. 282 (1893)). 
 77. See 4A SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 14.01. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id.; see also Village of South Orange v. Alden Corp., 365 A.2d 469, 472 (N.J. 
1976) (noting that “the compensation due the landowner may be expressed and may be 
determined in either of two ways”). 
 80. See 4A SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 14.02[1] (“Virtually all jurisdictions allow the use 
of the before and after methodology.”). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See id. § 14.02[2]. 
 83. See Schopflocher, supra note 13, at 16. 
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E.   The Offsetting Doctrine and the Justifications for Its Limitations 
In order to address this problem, the majority of courts follow a complex 
offsetting doctrine.84  Under the majority formulation of the doctrine, “a 
condemnor may offset the amount of compensation it owes a landowner by 
any ‘special benefits’ to the remaining property,” but general benefits may 
not offset.85 
Courts have struggled to cohesively define general and special benefits.86  
In fact, some courts have argued, “it is often impossible to distinguish 
between [general and special benefits].”87  At least in definitional terms, a 
general benefit is typically referred to as a benefit held in common with 
neighboring lands.88  In contrast, special benefits are roughly defined as 
benefits that “are direct and peculiar to the particular property.”89  For 
example, most courts would consider the widening of a road in a large city 
a general benefit, but building a highway along an isolated property would 
likely be considered a special benefit.90  However, despite these definitions, 
courts reach different classifications regarding near identical projects.91  For 
example, faced with classifying the construction of a railroad that improved 
travel, the Court of Appeals of Maryland defined the benefit as “general,”92 
whereas the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reached the opposite 
conclusion.93  Courts have also struggled to classify highways,94 river 
channels,95 and telephone lines.96  Despite these difficulties, the offsetting 
 
 84. See 4A SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 14.03[3] (“[M]ost states allow offsets for special 
benefits.”).  This offsetting doctrine has some analogy to the general/special benefits 
dichotomy in special assessment taxes.  A special assessment is “a tax on property that 
benefits in some important way from a public improvement.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
139 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “assessment”).  For further discussion of the interaction 
between condemnation and special assessments, see infra Part I.H. 
 85. 4A SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 14.03[3]. 
 86. See Schopflocher, supra note 13, at 48–49. 
 87. Bramlett v. City Council of Greenville, 70 S.E. 450, 452 (S.C. 1911). 
 88. See, e.g., United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411, 416 (1926) 
(defining a general benefit as “sharing in the common advantage and convenience of 
increased public facilities, and the general advance in value of real estate in the vicinity by 
reason thereof”); Hendler v. United States, 175 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(“[B]enefits that inure to the community at large are considered general.”); see also 4A 
SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 14.03[3]. 
 89. United States v. Trout, 386 F.2d 216, 221–22 (5th Cir. 1967) (quoting United States 
v. 2477.79 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situate in Bell Cnty., 259 F.2d 23, 28 (5th Cir. 
1958)); see also 4A SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 14.03[3]. 
 90. Deposition of Stephen J. Matonis at 32–33, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. 
Dist., No. CI-94-5673, 2006 WL 6912444 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2006), 2006 WL 6931483. 
 91. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
 92. Lake Roland El. Ry. Co. v. Frick, 37 A. 650, 652 (Md. 1897). 
 93. Peabody v. Bos. Elevated Ry., 78 N.E. 392, 393 (Mass. 1906). 
 94. See Schopflocher, supra note 13, at 101–08. 
 95. See id. at 108. 
 96. See id. 
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doctrine is followed at the federal level97 and in the overwhelming majority 
of states.98 
In contrast to a “giving,”99 a partial taking allows an owner to receive a 
benefit from the taking:  he or she owns the remaining land, which has 
increased in value.100  The condemnee will receive this value if he sells the 
property.101 
A number of justifications exist for limiting offsetting to special 
benefits.102  A significant number of courts have limited offsetting to 
special benefits on a theory that “every citizen, as a taxpayer, should share 
the common benefits of a government whose common burden he is required 
to bear.”103  Under this line of reasoning, the owner suffers a peculiar 
damage and is thereby entitled to compensation for only that peculiar 
damage.104  A general benefit,105 as opposed to a special benefit, is not 
peculiar to that single landowner and therefore cannot fairly reduce the 
landowner’s unique harm.106  In these courts’ view, the landowner is 
entitled to benefit from the taking project.107  The courts suggest that the 
general benefits offered already “belong to the public, and the parties . . . 
[whose land is taken] are . . . entitled to their equal share.”108 
A similar line of reasoning suggests that the expense of public works 
should be borne by the public.109  These courts hold that offsetting an 
eminent domain award by a general benefit effectively requires the 
landowner to “bear a portion of the expense of the [project].”110  If a 
general benefit offsets a condemnation award, the landowner, in effect, 
double pays by virtue of their payment of public taxes.111 
 
 97. See, e.g., City of Van Buren v. United States, 697 F.2d 1058, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
(noting that only special and direct benefits may offset a condemnation award). 
 98. See 4A SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 14.03[3]; see also Schopflocher, supra note 13, at 
156–293. 
 99. For a discussion of givings, see infra Part I.C. 
 100. See Paul Sinnitt, Offsetting Special Benefits and the Larger Parcel Test in Eminent 
Domain, 1 GONZ. L. REV. 77, 80–81 (1966). 
 101. See id. 
 102. See Schopflocher, supra note 13, at 40. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Hickman v. City of Kansas, 25 S.W. 225, 229 (Mo. 1894) (noting that 
compensation for land damaged for the public use is limited to those “peculiar to his 
property”). 
 105. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 106. See Hickman, 25 S.W. at 229. 
 107. See Meacham v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 58 Mass. (1 Cush.) 291, 297 (1849) (“The 
party, whose land has been taken . . . has a right, in common with his other fellow-citizens, 
to the benefit arising from the [project].”); Woodfolk v. Nashville & Chattanooga R.R. Co., 
32 Tenn. (2 Swan) 422, 436 (1852) (“[T]hese are benefits to which he is entitled with the 
community in general.”); Blair v. City of Charleston, 26 S.E. 341, 345 (W. Va. 1896) (noting 
landowners “pay[] taxes along with others” for general benefits). 
 108. City of Cincinnati v. Williams, 8 Ohio Dec. Reprint 718, 722 (C.P. 1883). 
 109. See Adden v. White Mountains, N.H. R.R., 55 N.H. 413, 414 (1875). 
 110. Id.; see also Meacham, 58 Mass. (1 Cush.) at 297 (noting the “great inequality” in 
charging a landowner for the “incidental benefits” of a taking). 
 111. Carpenter v. Landaff, 42 N.H. 218, 221 (1860). 
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An analogous argument is that by requiring a landowner to “pay” through 
an offset of his condemnation award, neighboring landowners receive the 
benefits of the project for free.112  A leading case suggests that allowing 
such a result “would operate with great inequality.”113 
A final justification, well discussed in the literature,114 is that while 
arguably constitutionally permissible to offset,115 general benefits should 
not be offset because they are “speculative and remote.”116  Recently, 
courts have questioned this justification, arguing that such reasoning should 
serve to bar any speculative benefit, but not general benefits as a class.117 
F.   The Historical Development of the Offsetting Doctrine 
As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said, “‘a page of history’ is sometimes 
‘worth a volume of logic.’”118  A survey of early partial takings cases does 
not necessarily reveal a clear starting point for the doctrine.119  What is 
clear, however, is that courts originally did not employ any distinction 
between general and special benefits.120  Additionally, the principle of 
offsetting is not found in the early English laws on expropriation of 
property.121 
Instead, state legislatures and courts began to permit the offsetting of all 
benefits in an effort to support nineteenth-century roadway and railroad 
 
 112. Keithsburg & E. R.R. Co. v. Henry, 79 Ill. 290, 294 (1875) (noting the injustice in 
other landowners receiving the benefits of a project for free); see also Beveridge v. Lewis, 
70 P. 1083, 1086 (Cal. 1902), overruled by L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cont’l Dev. 
Corp., 941 P.2d 809 (Cal. 1997). 
 113. Meacham, 58 Mass. (1 Cush.) at 297. 
 114. See, e.g., Weston L. Johnson, Note, Benefits and Just Compensation in California, 
20 HASTINGS L.J. 764, 766–67 (1969); P. Dexter Peacock, Note, The Offset of Benefits 
Against Losses in Eminent Domain Cases in Texas:  A Critical Appraisal, 44 TEX. L. REV. 
1564, 1566–67 (1966). 
 115. For a discussion of the constitutionality of offsetting, see infra Part II.A–B.  See also 
infra Part IV.A–B (arguing that offsetting is constitutional). 
 116. Hempstead v. Salt Lake City, 90 P. 397, 401 (Utah 1907); see also Ill. State Toll 
Highway Auth. v. Heritage Standard Bank & Trust Co., 552 N.E.2d 1151, 1158 (Ill. 1990) 
(citing Sanitary Dist. of Chi. v. Boening, 107 N.E. 810 (Ill. 1915)); Brand v. Union Elevated 
R. Co., 101 N.E. 247, 250 (Ill. 1913) (characterizing special benefits as any benefit not 
“conjectural or speculative”). 
 117. See Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d at 824 (permitting fact-finders to consider evidence 
that is not conjectural or speculative); see also Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 
524, 543 (N.J. 2013) (permitting presentation on “all non-speculative, reasonably calculable 
benefits”). 
 118. Karan, 70 A.3d at 535 (quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)). 
 119. For example, neither LEWIS ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN (1936), nor JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN (Matthew Bender 
3d ed. 2013)—both leading treatises—identify a first case that articulated the doctrine. 
 120. This is evident from an analysis of early eminent domain statutes. See 3 THEODORE 
SEDGWICK ET AL., A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 2305 (8th ed. 1891). 
 121. See Senior v. Metro. Ry. Co., (1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 107 (Ex.); 2 H & C 258 
(rejecting the “novel” idea that compensation can be offset by benefits); see also 2 PHILLIP 
NICHOLAS, NICHOLAS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 246 (Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1917) (“The 
notion that, if the construction of a public improvement will effect a benefit upon adjoining 
land, the owner is under an obligation to compensate the public for his good fortune has 
never received favor in English eyes.”). 
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development.122  One scholar referred to the practice as a “very large 
involuntary private subsidy of state undertakings.”123  Indeed, railroads 
made extensive use of the ability to offset and effectively paid for property 
with “benefits rather than . . . cash.”124 
The historical context in which this practice arose provides support for 
this view.  As the United States was undergoing a “wave of internal 
improvements” in the early nineteenth century,125 the first opinions 
considering offsetting began to appear in the state reporters.126  By the 
1830s, America entered “an era of railroad enthusiasm and noisy railroad 
fever.”127  Many purchased railroad-related paraphernalia as the nation 
“dreamed and planned ambitious rail lines that were to cross-unsettled 
territory, span rivers, and reach distant cities.”128 
The early nineteenth century opinions made no effort to classify benefits 
as general or special, and the New York high court went so far as to suggest 
that a landowner could be entirely compensated with benefits.129  As private 
companies, invested with the power of eminent domain,130 took advantage 
of the ability to offset, some began to compensate landowners entirely in 
benefits.  One scholar reported that railroad takings in Illinois frequently 
resulted in an award of $1.131  The problem became so pervasive that 
California passed a constitutional amendment banning the consideration of 
benefits entirely.132 
As a result, courts began to develop doctrines to limit the viability of this 
strategy—including the offsetting doctrine.133  In fact, it is no surprise that 
the first commonly discussed case creating a distinction between general 
 
 122. Harry N. Scheiber, The Road to Munn:  Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public 
Purpose in the State Courts, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 328, 363–64 (Donald Fleming & 
Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971). 
 123. Id. at 364. 
 124. Johnson, supra note 114, at 766. 
 125. Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 536 (N.J. 2013) (citing JOHN F. 
STOVER, AMERICAN RAILROADS 2–8 (2d ed. 1997)). 
 126. See, e.g., Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Key, 5 F. Cas. 563, 564 (C.C.D.D.C. 
1829) (finding it proper to offset benefits); Commonwealth v. Coombs, 2 Mass. (1 Tyng) 
489, 492 (1807) (permitting offsetting); Livingston v. City of New York, 8 Wend. 85, 85 
(N.Y. 1831) (“The benefit accruing to a person whose land is taken . . . may be set off 
against the loss or damage sustained by him by the taking of his property . . . .”). 
 127. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO UNITED STATES HISTORY 648–49 (Paul S. Boyer & 
Melvyn Dubofsky eds., 2001). 
 128. Id. at 649. 
 129. See Livingston, 8 Wend. at 85 (suggesting that a benefit can equal just 
compensation). 
 130. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 131. FISCHEL, supra note 50, at 80–84. 
 132. See Johnson, supra note 114, at 766.  The amended constitution provides: 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation having been first made to, or paid into court for, the owner, and no 
right of way . . . shall be appropriated to the use of any corporation . . . other than 
municipal until full compensation therefore be first made in money or ascertained 
and paid into Court for the owner, irrespective of any benefits from any 
improvement proposed by such corporation . . . . 
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14 (1879) (emphasis added). 
 133. See FISCHEL, supra note 50, at 80–84. 
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and special benefits involved a taking of property by a railroad.134  Indeed, 
the leading general-special benefit authorities in most states involve either 
railroads or road builders as the taking entity.135  The concern of courts was 
that jurors, especially in rural communities, would be overly optimistic 
when estimating the benefits of new municipal projects like highways and 
railroads.136 
G.   Offsetting in the Twenty-First Century:  Needs and Evidence 
This section brings the offsetting doctrine into the twenty-first century.  
First, it discusses the need of modern communities to exercise the power of 
eminent domain as a protective measure.  Second, this section reviews the 
evidentiary tools available to modern courts. 
1.   Needs 
Modern large municipal projects often endeavor to directly benefit the 
entire community.137  For example, scholars have written about the need to 
employ eminent domain to help protect communities from rising seas and 
coastal erosion.138  The rate of sea level rise since the turn of the 
millennium is twice the average rise during the twentieth century.139  Rising 
sea levels have forced homeowners to raise their houses, flooded cities, and 
magnified the damage created by coastal storms.140  Any solution to these 
problems is likely to incorporate some use of the power of eminent 
domain.141 
These concerns are present in Karan, a case concerning a joint federal 
and state beach restoration project.142  The dilemma of beach erosion and 
 
 134. See Meacham v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 58 Mass. (1 Cush.) 291, 292 (1849). 
 135. See, e.g., Beveridge v. Lewis, 70 P. 1083, 1084 (Cal. 1902), overruled by L.A. Cnty. 
Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d 809 (Cal. 1997); Adden v. White 
Mountains, N.H. R.R., 55 N.H. 413, 414–15 (1875); State v. Hudson Cnty. Bd. of Chosen 
Freeholders, 25 A. 322, 323 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1892). 
 136. See Peacock, supra note 114, at 1567–69 (suggesting that the majority rule offsetting 
only special benefits arose out of concern about overly optimistic jury estimates); see also 
Johnson, supra note 114 (suggesting that California adopted the rule to address overly 
speculative assessments concerning the benefit of railroads). 
 137. See Daniel John Granatell, Sand Dunes:  Friend or Foe? 19–25 (May 1, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Seton Hall Law eRepository) (discussing general 
and special benefits in the context of Sand Dunes). 
 138. See generally James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause:  
How to Save Wetlands and Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279 
(1998). 
 139. See Anny Cazenave & Gonéri Le Cozannet, Sea Level Rise and its Coastal Impacts, 
1 EARTH’S FUTURE (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 6), available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/2013EF000188/pdf. 
 140. Wendy Koch, Rising Sea Levels Torment Norfolk, Va., and Coastal United States, 
USA TODAY (Dec. 18, 2013), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story 
/news/nation/2013/12/17/sea-level-rise-swamps-norfolk-us-coasts/3893825/. 
 141. See Titus, supra note 138, at 1388–89 (suggesting that set-backs, used in a 
comprehensive shore plan, require the landowner to be compensated). 
 142. Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524 (N.J. 2013); see supra notes 8–9 
and accompanying text. 
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rising seas presents coastal municipalities with three choices:  
“(1) relocation, (2) construction of shore protection structures, or (3) beach 
replenishment.”143  Homeowners are rarely agreeable to relocation,144 and 
both shore protection structures and beach replenishment will typically 
require the condemnation of some land.145  With this in mind, state 
lawmakers and courts must determine how to respond to offsetting after 
facing  “billions of dollars of land, building, and personal damage” caused 
by coastal flooding.146 
To address this problem, one author argues that the federal government 
should remove development from the floodplains by public acquisition of 
floodplain property.147  To pay for the repurchasing programs, the author 
argues that the government should offset the value of past-givings, 
including beach restoration projects, federal flood insurance, and even the 
construction of bridges.148  Specifically, the author proposes a “givings 
recapture mechanism,” whereby an owner’s just compensation is reduced 
by the value of an increase that is attributable to government action.149  In 
the author’s view, just compensation only entitles the owner to receive the 
value of the condemned property, excluding any givings.150  Providing any 
further compensation would effectively require “the public as a whole to 
subsidize . . . preferential treatment.”151 
The inability of municipalities to offset the benefits of a partial taking 
often results in abandonment of a beach restoration project.152  Imagine that 
the cost of condemning a portion of coastal beach front to build a sand dune 
is approximately $375,000 per property, without offsetting any benefits 
from the project.153  Multiplying this value by “the homes that line the 
coastline and the cost to municipalities would be prohibitive.”154 
This problem arises in a time when the need for sand dunes and other 
flood protection is at its highest.155  Numerous scholarly sources discuss 
both the need and effectiveness of sea walls and sand dunes protecting 
 
 143. Granatell, supra note 137, at 3. 
 144. See id. at 4. 
 145. See id. at 14–15. 
 146. Id. at 8–9. 
 147. See Barnhizer, supra note 71, at 342. 
 148. See id. at 317, 325, 328. 
 149. See id. at 356–57. 
 150. See id. at 355. 
 151. See id. at 355 n.259 (citing Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 66, at 544). 
 152. See Granatell, supra note 137, at 25. 
 153. For a discussion of a similar hypothetical, see James Osborne, Shore Towns Near 
Showdown with Dune-Building Foes, PHILA. INQUIRER (Dec. 3, 2012), available at 
http://articles.philly.com/2012-12-03/news/35550241_1_dune-sandy-damage-barrier-islands. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See, e.g., Glenn Blain, Cuomo Announces $50M Project to Protect Sandy-Battered 
Queens Coast from Storms, N.Y DAILY NEWS (Nov. 30, 2013), available at 
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/queens/cuomo-announces-50m-project-protect-
queens-storms-article-1.1533270; Jacqueline L. Urgo, Sandy-Battered Shore Town Awaits 
$40 Million Seawall, PHILA. INQUIRER (Dec. 10, 2012), available at 
http://articles.philly.com/2013-12-10/news/44993514_1_hurricane-sandy-sand-dunes-
seawall. 
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against flooding.156  For example, civil engineering professors were able to 
show that during Hurricane Sandy, the presence of a sea wall in one New 
Jersey town limited damage to largely flooding homes, whereas 56 percent 
of homes were destroyed in a nearby town that was not protected by a 
seawall.157  Additionally, during Hurricane Sandy, some Long Island towns 
were spared catastrophic damage because of the presence of fifteen-foot-
high dunes, while a neighboring town that voted against building dunes 
“suffered at least $200 million in property damage and infrastructure 
loss.”158 
Seeing the benefits of these projects, many political leaders and property 
owners are hopeful that changes to partial takings law, namely permitting 
general benefits to offset, will help facilitate the construction of protections 
against natural hazards.  New Jersey Governor Christopher Christie called 
New Jersey’s rejection of the general/special benefits dichotomy “a 
‘decisive victory’ for towns,” and hoped it would prompt homeowners that 
were holding out to settle.159  Some have suggested that repealing the 
general/special benefits dichotomy will bring fairness to partial takings 
cases and allow for the construction of protections against natural 
hazards.160 
2.   Evidence 
Contemporary legal systems have expanded the evidence that is available 
to prove valuation in any takings case.161  Litigants now have extensive 
data available concerning the sale of the property and the price paid for 
similar properties.162  Additionally, the court can often allow the jury to 
conduct a physical inspection of the property called, “the View.”163  The 
jury can use “the View” to evaluate “the physical characteristics of the 
property, [and] the improvement constructed on the part taken.”164  In 
Karan, the jury inspected the Karans’ property and home before 
deliberations began.165  Presumably, if the court had allowed the jury to 
 
 156. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Irish et al., Buried Relic Seawall Mitigates Hurricane Sandy’s 
Impacts, 80 COASTAL ENG’G 79, 82 (2013) (discussing the “need for multiple levels of 
protection against natural hazards”); supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text (discussing the 
use and effectiveness of sand dunes). 
 157. See Irish et al., supra note 156, at 81. 
 158. Navarro & Nuwer, supra note 3. 
 159. See MaryAnn Spoto, Supreme Court Rejects $375,000 ‘Windfall’ for Harvey Cedars 
Couple Who Didn’t Want Dune Built, STAR-LEDGER (N.J.), July 9, 2013, available at 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2013/07/harvey_cedars_dunes_karans.html.  For a 
discussion of New Jersey’s rejection of the general/special benefits dichotomy, see infra Part 
III.C.2. 
 160. See Lawrence H. Shapiro & Heather L. Garleb, New Jersey Modernizes Partial 
Takings Compensation, 65 PLAN. & ENVTL. 8, 11 (2013). 
 161. See 5 SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 18.01–.19 (discussing the use of evidence in 
condemnation proceedings). 
 162. See id. § 18.05[4]. 
 163. See id. § 18.08. 
 164. Id. § 18.08[4]. 
 165. See Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 531 (N.J. 2013). 
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consider the benefits of the sand dune project,166 the jurors could have 
assessed the proximity of the house to the ocean. 
Modern condemnation litigation also makes extensive use of expert 
testimony.167  The modern approach is that qualified witnesses may testify 
to both the damage suffered and the value of the property after the 
taking.168  Expert witnesses inform the jury of their valuation of a particular 
property and provide their reasoning.169  On cross examination, the expert 
witness can be questioned on past appraisals of the property, past appraisals 
of other properties in the area, consistency of the appraisal with past 
statements, and the qualifications of the expert to testify.170  Courts also 
have the option of resorting to court-appointed experts in the event that the 
“adversary experts are shockingly irreconcilable.”171 
H.   Partial Condemnation and Special Assessments 
When government entities engage in public improvements, these projects 
are often financed through special assessments.172  A special assessment is 
a tax on the property to pay for the benefits of a project.173  A government 
entity may levy a special assessment when the local improvement is public 
in nature and confers a special benefit on the property.174 
Courts have nearly universally held that special assessments cannot 
augment an award of severance damages when the condemnor did not seek 
to offset a condemnation award.175  However, the result is different when 
“the condemnor is permitted to set off against severance damages special 
benefits which have accrued to the remaining land by reason of the 
improvement.”176  In these cases, courts generally hold that a special 
assessment may reduce any set off for special benefits.177 
In City of Jackson v. Barks,178 the city of Jackson condemned a portion 
of the Barks’ land to extend the city’s sewer system.179  The city argued 
 
 166. But see id. at 529–30. 
 167. See 5 SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 23.06–.11 (discussing the use of expert evidence in 
condemnation cases). 
 168. See, e.g., Am. La. Pipe Line Co. v. Kennerk, 144 N.E.2d 660, 665–66 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1957). 
 169. See 5 SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 23.08[1] (discussing direct examination). 
 170. See id. § 23.08[2] (discussing cross-examination). 
 171. See id. § 23.11. 
 172. See Annotation, Eminent Domain:  Consideration of Fact That Landowner’s 
Remaining Land Will Be Subject to Special Assessment in Fixing Severance Damages, 59 
A.L.R.3d 534, § 1[a] (1974). 
 173. See supra note 82; see also 89 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 2, at 421 (2006). 
 174. See 89 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 2, at 421 (2006). 
 175. See, e.g., City of Tucson v. Rickles, 505 P.2d 253, 257 (Ariz. 1973); City of Baldwin 
Park v. Stoskus, 503 P.2d 1333, 1336 (Cal. 1972) (“[I]t is the general rule that ‘where a part 
of a tract of land is taken for a public use, the mere fact that the remainder may thereafter be 
subject to assessment does not constitute an element of damages in condemnation 
proceedings.’”). 
 176. See Annotation, supra note 172. 
 177. See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Rd. Comm’rs v. Vermander, 219 N.W. 74, 75–76 (Mich. 
1928); City of Jackson v. Barks, 476 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972). 
 178. 476 S.W.2d 162 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972). 
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that as a result of the sewer connection, the Barks’ land was specially 
benefited, increasing in value by $22,000.180 
The trial court admitted evidence that the Barks had paid $7606 in 
“special sewer” taxes, and the city appealed.181  The appellant court held 
that it was appropriate for the trial court to consider the appreciation in 
value due to the sewer project.182  The court stressed that this amount must 
be the “net appreciation.”183  The city could not require the Barks “to pay 
twice for the sewer line.”184  The Barks were permitted to show what they 
paid for the sewer line to reduce the increased value claimed by the city.185  
In a similar case involving the construction of a highway,186 the Supreme 
Court of Michigan held that a special assessment must act as a credit 
against any benefits considered when awarding compensation.187  The court 
found that failing to credit the assessment would result in the landowner 
being charged twice.188 
II.   THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF OFFSETTING 
Part II presents the leading authorities on the question of whether it is 
constitutionally permissible to offset condemnation awards under both the 
federal and state constitutions.  Part II.A discusses the major challenges to 
the constitutionality of offsetting under the federal Constitution.  Part II.B 
presents the major arguments that state courts have articulated when 
holding that offsetting general benefits violates their respective 
constitutions. 
A.   Federal Constitutional Challenges to Offsetting 
As soon as legislatures and courts began offsetting, landowners brought 
challenges asserting that the practice violated the Takings Clause.189  
Presented in this section is an early challenge, Chesapeake & Ohio Canal 
Co. v. Key,190 the most significant Supreme Court authority on the subject, 
Bauman v. Ross,191 and the last Supreme Court case discussing offsetting, 
United States v. Miller.192 
 
 179. See id. at 163. 
 180. See id.  
 181. See id. 
 182. See id. at 165. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 164. 
 185. See id. at 165. 
 186. See Bd. of Cnty. Rd. Comm’rs v. Vermander, 219 N.W. 74, 74–75 (Mich. 1928). 
 187. See id. at 76. 
 188. See id. at 75 (“[I]f awarded damages, less his benefits, and there is also imposed a 
special assessment for benefits, which he must pay in full, then just compensation is not 
awarded, for, in such case, he is twice charged with benefits.”). 
 189. For a discussion of the Takings Clause, see supra Part I.A.2. 
 190. 5 F. Cas. 563 (C.C.D.D.C. 1829); see also Scheiber, supra note 122, at 364 (noting 
that Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Key was an early constitutional challenge to 
offsetting). 
 191. 167 U.S. 548 (1897). 
 192. 317 U.S. 369 (1943). 
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1.   Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Key 
In Key, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia was faced with a 
constitutional challenge to a Virginia state charter that granted the 
Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. the power of eminent domain.193  Pursuant 
to the charter, the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. condemned F.S. Key’s 
land to construct a canal along the Potomac River.194 
Key claimed that the charter, which required the jury to consider the 
benefits that would accrue to landowners, was unconstitutional because “no 
provision [was] made for just compensation.”195  The court further noted 
the position that the Takings Clause provides for “positive, 
not . . . conjectural composition.”196  Under such a view, the charter would 
have been unconstitutional because after considering the benefits, the jurors 
might have concluded that the landowner was entitled to no 
compensation.197 
Instead of adopting a “positive” view of the Takings Clause, the court 
reasoned that the clause adopts only a “general principle” for 
compensation.198  Even if the charter had not required the jurors to consider 
benefits, they would have been constitutionally free to do so.199  The 
Takings Clause requires compensation to be given, not paid,200 and such 
compensation should be “just in regard to the public, as well as in regard to 
the individual.”201 
2.   Bauman v. Ross 
In Bauman, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to takings 
conducted by the District of Columbia.202  The commissioners of the 
District of Columbia condemned a “permanent right of way for the 
public.”203  The right of way was needed to create a permanent system of 
highways to connect suburban subdivisions near the capital area.204  The 
District of Columbia—authorized by Congress205 and bolstered by 
Key206—set benefits off against the value of land taken.207 
In deciding the case, the Court surveyed the decisions of a number of 
state high courts including Massachusetts,208 New York,209 New Jersey,210 
 
 193. Key, 5 F. Cas. at 563. 
 194. See id. at 563, 565. 
 195. Id. at 564. 
 196. Id. 
 197. See id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See id. 
 200. See id. (“[T]he constitution does not require that the value should be paid.”). 
 201. Id. (emphasis added). 
 202. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 571 (1897). 
 203. Id. at 561. 
 204. See id. 
 205. Id. at 570. 
 206. Id. (referencing Key, 5 F. Cas. at 563). 
 207. See id. 
 208. See id. at 577 (citing Meacham v. Fitchburg R. Co., 58 Mass. (1 Cush.) 291 (1849)). 
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Pennsylvania,211 and Ohio.212  Justice Gray found that most states permitted 
special benefits to be set off, and that in many states, set offs for general 
benefits were also permitted.213  The Court then explicitly stated, “[t]he 
Constitution of the United States contains no express prohibition against 
considering benefits in estimating the just compensation to be paid for 
private property taken for the public use.”214  This statement, which the 
Court bolstered with citations to authorities permitting offsets of both 
general and special benefits,215 seemingly suggests that all offsets are 
constitutionally permissible. 
However, the Court also treated the exclusion of general benefits as 
obvious.216  The Court excluded the consideration of general benefits on the 
grounds that the landowner already paid for those benefits through 
taxation.217  Despite this exclusion, the Court never said that the 
consideration of general benefits would be unconstitutional nor 
characterized the States that do so as violating a constitutional provision.218  
The failure to characterize the state practices as unconstitutional is 
especially noteworthy because in the same term the Court held that the 
Takings Clause applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.219 
Many federal and state courts cited Bauman for the proposition that only 
special benefits could constitutionally offset an eminent domain award.220  
The Supreme Court clarified the meaning of Bauman in 1918, noting that 
the Court could not say if the consideration of “actual benefits” violated a 
fundamental right.221  The Supreme Court of Alabama has cited McCoy for 
the proposition that states have a “constitutional right . . . to permit a 
deduction for general benefits.”222  This is a proposition that litigants seem 
to have accepted, as none of the major cases permitting the offsetting of 
 
 209. See id. at 578 (citing Livingston v. City of New York, 8 Wend. 85 (N.Y. 1831)). 
 210. See id. at 592 (citing State v. Hudson Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 25 A. 322 
(N.J. 1892)). 
 211. See id. at 579–80 (citing Watson v. Pittsburgh & Connelsville R.R. Co., 37 Pa. 469 
(1861)). 
 212. See id. at 581 (citing Symonds v. City of Cincinnati, 14 Ohio 147 (1846) (en banc)). 
 213. See id. at 583–84.  The Court also references JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES (1888), a preeminent treatise on American 
eminent domain. 
 214. Bauman, 167 U.S. at 584 (emphasis added). 
 215. See id. (“[U]pon the authorities above stated, no such prohibition can be implied.”). 
 216. See id. at 581 (“We of course exclude the indirect and general benefits.”). 
 217. See id. 
 218. See id. 
 219. See Chi. Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 
(1897). 
 220. See, e.g., United States v. Trout, 386 F.2d 216, 221–22 (5th Cir. 1967); Campbell v. 
Bd. of Rd. Comm’rs of Davie Cnty., 92 S.E. 323, 323 (N.C. 1917). 
 221. McCoy v. Union Elevated R.R. Co., 247 U.S. 354, 366 (1918); see also 8A 
SACKMAN, supra note 6, § G16.04 (“It is up to each state to determine the measure of ‘just 
compensation’ and whether, and under what circumstances, benefits may be deducted from 
an award of ‘just compensation.’”). 
 222. McRea v. Marion County, 133 So. 278, 279 (Ala. 1931). 
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general benefits have been appealed to the Supreme Court.223  Additionally, 
the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in a case where the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina found that offsetting general benefits did not 
violate either the Fifth Amendment or the North Carolina Constitution.224 
3.   United States v. Miller 
Following Bauman, the Supreme Court did not revisit the offsetting 
doctrine in detail until United States v. Miller.225  In Miller, a portion of 
land was needed to construct a right of way for the Central Pacific 
Railroad.226  The taking was pursuant to a federal project.227  The project 
authorized land reclamation, which was required because the railways old 
right of way was susceptible to flooding.228 
At a jury trial to determine compensation, disputes concerning the 
relevance of testimony relating to the impact of the future government 
project resulted in significant litigation, which eventually made its way to 
the Supreme Court.229  The Court held that “if [a] taking has in fact 
benefited the remainder the benefit may be set off against the value of the 
land taken.”230  Despite citing Bauman,231 the Court did not use the terms 
general or special benefit in the opinion at all.232 
Miller has been cited four times for the proposition that offsetting is 
permissible.233  None of the courts citing Miller have suggested that 
offsetting general benefits would be unconstitutional, and only two of the 
courts have even noted a distinction between general and special 
benefits.234 
 
 223. See, e.g., MaryAnn Spoto, Harvey Cedars Couple Receives $1 Settlement For Dune 
Blocking Ocean View, STAR-LEDGER (N.J.) (Sept. 25, 2013), available at 
http://www.nj.com/ocean/index.ssf/2013/09/harvey_cedars_sand_dune_dispute_settled.html 
(noting that litigants settled rather than pursuing further appeal). 
 224. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Rowe, 549 S.E.2d 203, 209 (N.C. 2001). 
 225. 317 U.S. 369 (1943). 
 226. See id. at 370. 
 227. See id. 
 228. See id.  Land reclamation is “[t]he act or an instance of improving the value of 
economically useless land by physically changing the land.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1463 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “reclamation”).  An example would be a project to convert a 
former landfill into park land. See Allie Goolrick, Once World’s Largest Landfill, NYC’s 
Freshkills Park to Add a Solar Energy Plant, WEATHER CHANNEL (Dec. 3, 2013, 1:41 PM), 
http://www.weather.com/news/science/environment/freshkills-park-solar-power-20131203. 
 229. See Miller, 317 U.S. at 372–73. 
 230. See id. at 376 (citing Bauman v Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897)). 
 231. See id. at 376 n.21 (citing Bauman, 167 U.S. 548). 
 232. See id. at 369–82. 
 233. United States v. 4.0 Acres of Land, 175 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 1999); United 
States v. 3,317.39 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Jefferson Cnty., 443 F.2d 104, 105 (8th 
Cir. 1971); United States v. 901.89 Acres of Land in Davidson & Rutherford Cntys., 436 
F.2d 395, 398 (6th Cir. 1970); 6816.5 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Rio Arriba Cnty. v. 
United States, 411 F.2d 834, 837 (10th Cir. 1969). 
 234. 6816.5 Acres of Land, 411 F.2d at 837 (discussing “‘direct,’ ‘indirect,’ ‘general,’ and 
‘special,’ benefits”); 901.89 Acres of Land, 436 F.2d at 398 (noting a difference between 
general and special benefits). 
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B.   State Constitutional Challenges to Offsetting 
In the beginning of the twentieth century, a number of states considered 
whether offsetting general benefits would violate their own state 
constitutions.  For example, in Beveridge v. Lewis,235 the California 
Supreme Court determined that reducing compensation for general benefits 
violated the California Constitution.236  Philo Beveridge had condemned a 
thirty-five-foot right of way on Mary Lewis’s land for the construction of a 
Los Angeles Pacific Railway line.237  In finding that offsetting general 
benefits was constitutionally impermissible, the California Supreme Court 
relied largely on policy justifications.238  Specifically, the court found that 
all general benefits were “conjectural, and incapable of estimation.”239  On 
these grounds, the court found that it would violate the California 
Constitution to force a property owner to accept “compensation in such 
vague speculations.”240 
Many other state courts have at one time held “that the deduction of 
general benefits would violate the just compensation requirements” of their 
respective state constitutions.241  These courts largely relied on the 
perceived “remote, hypothetical, or speculative” nature of general benefits, 
finding that such benefits did not adequately ensure the payment of “just 
compensation.”242  Some states have simply followed the majority, without 
any interpretation of their own state constitutions.243 
III.   THE CURRENT STATE OF THE OFFSETTING DOCTRINE 
Part III discusses the current status of the offsetting doctrine at both the 
federal and state levels.  This part focuses on the offsetting doctrine as a 
policy option rather than a constitutional question.  Specifically, Part III.A 
provides an overview on the particular approaches jurisdictions follow.  
Part III.B presents the justifications for continuing the traditional offsetting 
doctrine—particularly, the justifications offered in recent opinions 
reaffirming the rule.  Part III.C explores the justifications offered by 
California and New Jersey for eliminating the distinction between general 
and special benefits. 
 
 235. 70 P. 1083 (Cal. 1902). 
 236. See id. at 1084–85. 
 237. See id. at 1084. 
 238. See id. at 1085–86.  For a further discussion of the policy justifications for 
prohibiting the offsetting of general benefits, see supra notes 101–04 and accompanying 
text. 
 239. Beveridge, 70 P. at 1085. 
 240. Id. at 1086. 
 241. Schopflocher, supra note 13, at 47. 
 242. See id.; see also Wash. Ice Co. v. City of Chicago, 35 N.E. 378, 379 (Ill. 1893) 
(finding that constitutional safeguards would be of no avail if “chimerical” or imaginative 
benefits could offset a condemnation award). 
 243. See, e.g., Daniels v. State Rd. Dep’t, 170 So. 2d 846, 853–54 (Fla. 1964) (discussing 
opinions from Pennsylvania and Virginia to establish that offsetting general benefits is 
impermissible). 
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A.   State and Federal Positions on Offsetting 
The rule applied in federal courts is that only special benefits can offset a 
condemnation award.244  This is a default rule, which applies regardless of 
whether the governing statute defines “the nature of the benefits to be 
deducted.”245  It is somewhat peculiar that federal courts have adopted this 
position when it is constitutionally permissible, under the Fifth 
Amendment, to offset general benefits.246  The circuit courts have largely 
relied on Bauman as prohibiting the offset of general benefits at the federal 
level.247 
The positions of the state courts are grouped into three major categories:  
one, states where benefits may not offset awards; two, states where special 
benefits may offset awards, and finally, states where general and special 
benefit may offset.248  The only states that do not permit any offsetting are 
Iowa and Mississippi.249  Under Mississippi law, compensation for a taking 
must be paid “in money.”250 
The overwhelming majority of states currently permit special, but not 
general, benefits to be offset.251  These states include:  Alaska,252 
Arizona,253 Arkansas,254 Colorado,255 Connecticut,256 Delaware,257  
Florida,258 Georgia,259 Hawaii,260 Idaho,261 Indiana,262 Kansas,263 
 
 244. See, e.g., Hendler v. United States, 175 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1999); United 
States v. Trout, 386 F.2d 216, 221–22 (5th Cir. 1967). 
 245. Schopflocher, supra note 13, at 158. 
 246. See supra Part II.A. 
 247. See, e.g., 6816.5 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Rio Arriba Cnty. v. United States, 
411 F.2d 834, 837 (10th Cir. 1969) (citing Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897)). 
 248. A leading treatise further divides these categories along whether the offset relates to 
damages to the remainder or the value of the part taken. See LEWIS ORGEL, VALUATION 
UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 1000 (1936). 
 249. See IOWA CONST. art. I, § 18; Dykes v. State Highway Comm’n of Miss., 535 So. 2d 
1349, 1351–52 (Miss. 1988) (citing Brown v. Beatty, 34 Miss. 227 (1857)). 
 250. Brown, 34 Miss. at 234. 
 251. See Schopflocher, supra note 13, at 40; see also L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. 
Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d 809, 825 (Cal. 1997) (noting that a minority of states permit the 
offsetting of general benefits). 
 252. State v. Lewis, 785 P.2d 24, 27 (Alaska 1990). 
 253. Taylor v. State ex rel. Herman, 467 P.2d 251, 254 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970). 
 254. Ark. State Highway Comm’n v. Welter, 471 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Ark. 1971) 
(Fogleman, J., concurring) (“[W]e have clearly adopted the rule that special benefits peculiar 
to the tract involved may be set off against both severance damages and the value of the land 
actually taken.”).  
 255. Mack v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 381 P.2d 987, 990–91 (Colo. 1963). 
 256. Brito v. City of Waterbury, 32 A.2d 162, 163 (Conn. 1943).  However, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court has upheld offsetting of a benefit, without defining it as general 
or special, when the improvement is not a public improvement. Tandet v. Urban 
Redevelopment Comm’n, 426 A.2d 280, 288 (Conn. 1979). 
 257. Acierno v. State, 643 A.2d 1328, 1332 (Del. 1994) (finding that general benefits may 
not be offset). 
 258. Daniels v. State Rd. Dep’t, 170 So. 2d 846, 853–54 (Fla. 1964). 
 259. Williams v. State Highway Dep’t, 185 S.E.2d 616, 617 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971). 
 260. Att’y Gen. v. Midkiff, 516 P.2d 1250, 1254 (Haw. 1973). 
 261. Tyson Creek R. Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 174 P. 1004, 1007 (Idaho 1918). 
 262. State v. Smith, 143 N.E.2d 666, 669 (Ind. 1957). 
 263. City of Wichita v. May’s Co., 510 P.2d 184, 188 (Kan. 1973). 
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Kentucky,264 Louisiana,265 Maine,266  Massachusetts,267 Minnesota,268 
Missouri,269 Montana,270 Nebraska,271 Nevada,272 New Hampshire,273 
North Dakota,274 Ohio,275 Oklahoma,276 Oregon,277 Pennsylvania,278 Rhode 
Island,279 South Carolina,280 South Dakota,281 Tennessee,282 Texas,283 
Utah,284 Vermont,285 Virginia,286 Washington,287 Wisconsin,288 and 
Wyoming.289 
The final group of states permit offsetting of both general and special 
benefits.  They include:  Alabama,290 Illinois,291 Maryland,292 Michigan,293 
New Mexico,294 New York,295 North Carolina,296 and West Virginia.297 
 
 264. E. Ky. Rural Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Smith, 310 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Ky. 1958). 
 265. Dep’t of Highways v. Trippeer Realty Corp., 276 So. 2d 315, 321 (La. 1973). 
 266. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 23, § 154 (2010). 
 267. Benton v. Town of Brookline, 23 N.E. 846, 847 (Mass. 1890). 
 268. Mattson v. Colon, 194 N.W.2d 574, 577 (Minn. 1972). 
 269. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. S. Dev. Co., 509 S.W.2d 18, 23–24 (Mo. 
1974). 
 270. Gallatin Valley Electric Ry. v. Neible, 186 P. 689, 690 (Mont. 1919). 
 271. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cent. Neb. Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 296 N.W. 752, 754 
(Neb. 1941). 
 272. State ex rel. Nev. Dep’t of Transp. v. Las Vegas Bldg. Materials, Inc., 761 P.2d 843, 
846 (Nev. 1988). 
 273. Lebanon Hous. Auth. v. Nat’l Bank of Lebanon, 301 A.2d 337, 339 (N.H. 1973). 
 274. Lineburg v. Sandven, 21 N.W.2d 808, 812 (N.D. 1946). 
 275. Hilliard v. First Indus., L.P., 846 N.E.2d 559, 565 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). 
 276. Guthrie & W. Ry. Co. v. Faulkner, 73 P. 290, 290 (Okla. 1903). 
 277. Dep’t of Transp. v. Montgomery Ward Dev. Corp., 719 P.2d 507, 512 (Or. Ct. App. 
1986). 
 278. Truck Terminal Realty Co. v. Dep’t of Transp., 403 A.2d 986, 988 (Pa. 1979). 
 279. Capital Properties, Inc. v. State, 636 A.2d 319, 323 (R.I. 1994). 
 280. See Wilson v. Greenville County, 96 S.E. 301, 304 (S.C. 1918). 
 281. State Highway Comm’n v. Bloom, 93 N.W.2d 572, 577 (S.D. 1958). 
 282. Faulkner v. City of Nashville, 285 S.W. 39, 45 (Tenn. 1926). 
 283. Taub v. City of Deer Park, 882 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Tex. 1994). 
 284. Hempstead v. Salt Lake City, 90 P. 397, 401 (Utah 1907). 
 285. Howe v. State Highway Bd., 187 A.2d 342, 345 (Vt. 1963). 
 286. See Shirley v. Russell, 140 S.E. 816, 822 (Va. 1927). 
 287. See State v. Templeman, 693 P.2d 125, 127 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). 
 288. Renk v. State, 191 N.W.2d 4, 8 (Wis. 1971). 
 289. See State Highway Comm’n v. Rollins, 471 P.2d 324, 329 (Wyo. 1970) (permitting 
the offset of special benefits, but not deciding if offsetting general benefits would be 
permissible). 
 290. McRea v. Marion Cnty., 133 So. 278, 280 (Ala. 1931) (“[T]he damages to adjoining 
property shall be reduced by all the benefits general and special.”). 
 291. In Illinois, technically only special benefits may offset, but special benefits are 
defined as “[a]ny benefits to the property which enhance its market value and are not 
conjectural or speculative are considered special rather than general benefits.” Ill. State Toll 
Highway Auth. v. Heritage Standard Bank & Trust Co., 552 N.E.2d 1151, 1158 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1990). 
 292. Big Pool Holstein Farms, Inc. v. State Rds. Comm’n, 225 A.2d 283, 288 (Md. 1967). 
 293. Mich. State Highway Comm’n v. Frederick, 188 N.W.2d 193, 195 (Mich. 1971) 
(noting that Michigan law makes no distinction between general and special benefits). 
 294. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 417 P.2d 68, 
70 (N.M. 1966) (“[T]he market value of the remaining property necessarily includes any 
increase in the value thereof contributed by any kind of benefits accruing to it.”). 
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California298 and New Jersey299 have also recently decided to permit both 
general and special benefits to offset. 
B.   Modern Justifications for the Traditional Offsetting Doctrine 
Courts that have recently upheld the traditional offsetting doctrine have 
largely relied on the same justifications as the nineteenth-century courts that 
created the doctrine.300  In fact, in the majority of recent cases, mid-level 
state appellate courts conclusively hold that the traditional offsetting 
doctrine is the law of their state without providing justification.301 
For example, in 2011, the Missouri Court of Appeals upheld an 
application of the traditional offsetting doctrine.302  The City of Maryland 
Heights condemned a portion of Robert Heitz’s land to construct a public 
road to facilitate new real estate development opportunities.303  The city 
argued that the project was a special benefit because it increased the 
“accessibility, visibility, frontage, and connectivity” of the Heitz 
property.304  The Missouri court noted that the “distinction between general 
and special benefits has been identified as ‘shadowy at best.’”305  Despite 
this characterization, the court upheld the traditional doctrine, arguing that 
“to otherwise allow an offset for general benefits would effectively require 
the one whose land was taken to subsidize a project that the rest of the 
community received at no cost.”306 
In a recent case, the Supreme Court of Texas upheld its traditional 
offsetting rule.307  A Texas city condemned a portion of Henry Taub’s land 
to build a drainage ditch.308  The city argued that the condemnation award 
should be offset by the value of the drainage ditch, which decreased the 
property’s susceptibility to flooding.309  Taub countered that the drainage 
ditch was a general benefit, as the decreased flooding would be shared with 
the general community.310  The Texas court agreed with Taub’s 
 
 295. Chiesa v. State, 324 N.E.2d 329, 331 (N.Y. 1974) (“Value of land taken 
consequential damages to remainder minus general and special benefits = just 
compensation.”). 
 296. Dep’t of Transp. v. Rowe, 549 S.E.2d 203, 209 (N.C. 2001) (finding that it was 
constitutional for jury to consider “general benefits”). 
 297. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Johnson, 60 S.E.2d 203, 206–07 (W. Va. 1950) 
(requiring the consideration of “all benefits”). 
 298. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d 809, 824–25 (Cal. 
1997). 
 299. Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 543 (N.J. 2013). 
 300. For a discussion of these justifications, see supra Part I.E. 
 301. See, e.g., Dep’t of Highways v. Modica, 515 So. 2d 449 (La. Ct. App. 1987). 
 302. See City of Md. Heights v. Heitz, 358 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011). 
 303. See id. at 103. 
 304. Id. at 105. 
 305. Id. at 106 (citing State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n of Mo. v. Koziatek, 639 
S.W.2d 86, 88 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)). 
 306. Id. 
 307. See Taub v. City of Deer Park, 882 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Tex. 1994). 
 308. See id. 
 309. See id. 
 310. See id. 
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characterization, and held that general benefits could not offset a 
condemnation award because a landowner should not have to pay twice for 
benefits “that inure to the community at large.”311 
In addition to the views of state judges, one scholar supported limiting 
offsetting to special benefits because it reduces administrative costs.312  The 
author acknowledges that permitting offsetting would simplify the judicial 
process and promote fairness.313  However, the author contends that it 
would also increase administrative costs.314  Property owners would be 
“encourage[ed]” to introduce evidence on “any and all kinds of problems a 
project might cause for their remainders,” resulting in increased litigation 
costs.315 
C.   The California and New Jersey Approach 
This section describes how California and New Jersey have rejected the 
distinction between general and special benefits. 
In California, one of the leading authorities eliminating the distinction 
permitting the offsetting of both general and special benefits is the 
California Supreme Court’s decision in Los Angeles County Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority v. Continental Development Corp.316 
In Continental Development, the Los Angeles County Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority (MTA) condemned a portion of land owned by 
the Continental Development Corporation (Continental) to construct an 
elevated light rail line called the Green Line.317  Prior to trial, the MTA 
provided both evidence and expert testimony that suggested Continental’s 
property would increase in value by millions of dollars because of the 
Green Line project.318  The MTA noted that Continental’s property was 
only a ten-minute walk from a Green Line train station.319  The MTA 
offered to settle for $200,000.320 
The trial court determined that the development of the transit line would 
be shared “by numerous properties” and therefore excluded any evidence 
concerning the benefit of the light rail project.321  The trial court stated that 
“[t]he benefit of being within walking distance of a rail transit station is 
merely the benefit of access.  As such it confers no peculiar or unique 
 
 311. See id. at 828; see also supra notes 101–06 and accompanying text (discussing the 
theory that every citizen has a right to the common benefits of government). 
 312. See Juliet E. Cox, Comment, Accessing the Benefits of California’s New Valuation 
Rule for Partial Condemnations, 88 CAL. L. REV. 565, 600–02 (2000). 
 313. See id. at 600–01. 
 314. See id. at 601. 
 315. Id.  However, eliminating the general/special benefit dichotomy may reduce 
litigation. See infra notes 360–65 and accompanying text. 
 316. 941 P.2d 809 (Cal. 1997). 
 317. See id. at 811–12. 
 318. See id. at 813. 
 319. See id. 
 320. See L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 466, 469 
(Ct. App. 1995), superseded by 911 P.2d 1373 (Cal. 1996), rev’d, 941 P.2d 809 (Cal. 1997). 
 321. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d at 812–13. 
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benefit upon defendant’s property.”322  The jury awarded $1,122,149 in 
damages.323  The MTA appealed, arguing that the “distinction between 
general and special benefits is unworkable, produces inconsistent 
results . . . , and should be abolished.”324 
On appeal, the California Supreme Court described the historical 
development of the offsetting doctrine.325  Specifically, the court discussed 
its earlier ruling in Beveridge v. Lewis.326  The court noted the old theory 
dictating that compensation must be in money, “rather than ‘conjectured 
advantage.’”327  Further the court discussed lack of clarity in the Beveridge 
rule—specifically, what types of benefits were to be considered, general 
versus special.328 
In reference to this lack of clarity, the Continental Development court 
discussed how the traditional offsetting rule had proved difficult to 
apply.329  A justice of a California appellate court described the distinction 
as “causing ‘confusion.’”330 
As California courts struggled to discover a meaningful distinction 
between general and special benefits, they reached inconsistent 
decisions.331  The California Supreme Court cited a case where a project 
creating highway access had been found to generate special benefits in the 
case of the highway and general benefits in the case of a freeway and off-
ramp.332  The court also cited instances where lower courts had reached 
inconsistent decisions regarding the classification of benefits arising from a 
transit line and station.333  The court recapitulated that the cases following 
Beveridge had failed to create any clear rules.334 
The California Supreme Court also discussed the Beveridge court’s 
concern with the “sanguine promoter”—that is, the overly optimistic project 
that is never completed, an issue that was particularly acute during 
nineteenth-century railroad development.335  The California court 
characterized this concern as an issue of evidence rather than general versus 
 
 322. See id. at 813. 
 323. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 469. 
 324. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d at 812. 
 325. See id. at 814–18.  For a detailed discussion of the history of offsetting in California 
prior to Continental Development, see Johnson, supra note 114. 
 326. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d at 814–818 (discussing Beveridge v. Lewis, 70 P. 1083 
(Cal. 1902)). For a discussion of Beveridge, see supra notes 235–40 and accompanying text. 
 327. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d at 817 (quoting Beveridge, 70 P. at 1083). 
 328. See id. at 817–20. 
 329. See id. at 818. 
 330. Id. (quoting Gleaves, Special Benefits in Eminent Domain, Phantom of the Opera, 40 
CAL. ST. B.J. 245, 249 (1965)). 
 331. See id. 
 332. See id. (citing Pierpont Inn, Inc. v. State, 449 P.2d 737 (Cal. 1969)). 
 333. See id. (affirming a finding of general benefits resulting from the construction of a 
transit station (citing L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
466, 470 (Ct. App. 1995))); Orpheum Bldg. Co. v. S.F. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 146 
Cal. Rptr. 5, 14 (Ct. App. 1978) (affirming jury finding of special benefits resulting from the 
construction of a transit station)). 
 334. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d at 818–19. 
 335. See id. at 820 (quoting Beveridge v. Lewis, 70 P. 1083, 1085 (Cal. 1902)). 
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special benefits.336  The court stated that “[t]he demands of fairness are 
satisfied when compensation is determined on the basis of substantial 
evidence establishing, to a reasonable certainty, the value of the property 
taken and the net effect on the remainder property’s value of benefits and 
detriments resulting from the project.”337  On the fairness point, the court 
added that fair compensation must be just, not only to the landowner, but 
also to the general public.338 
Reflecting the court’s concern about uncertainty and the notion that 
overly speculative benefits reflected an evidentiary concern present not only 
for general benefits, but for all valuation issues,339 the court overturned the 
traditional offsetting rule and announced a rule “permitting offset [of] all 
reasonably certain, immediate, and nonspeculative  benefits.”340  In 
California, so long as a benefit is not conjectural or speculative, as proven 
by evidence, it may offset a condemnation award.341 
The New Jersey Supreme Court also rejected the distinction between 
general and special benefits in Karan342  approaching the question much 
like the California Supreme Court.343 
The court began by discussing the early justifications for adopting the 
“special/general benefits dichotomy” in New Jersey.344  First, previous New 
Jersey cases had suggested that offsetting for general benefits would force a 
property owner to “contribute more for the public and common benefit than 
his neighbor,”345 a double payment argument.346  Early New Jersey cases 
also expressed a concern that general benefits were speculative and could 
lead to the legislature substituting “an imaginary benefit for . . . just 
compensation.”347  Placing this concern in context, the court discussed the 
historical period when courts created the offsetting doctrine, the period of 
time when “the laying of tracks for railroads [] stitched together far-flung 
communities and states into a nation during the nineteenth century.”348  The 
 
 336. See id. 
 337. Id. 
 338. See id. at 823 (citing United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 
123 (1950)). 
 339. See supra notes 335–38 and accompanying text. 
 340. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d at 824. 
 341. See id. 
 342. For a discussion of the procedural history and facts of Harvey Cedars, see supra 
notes 8–19 and accompanying text. 
 343. See supra Part III.C. 
 344. Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 535 (N.J. 2013).  For a more 
detailed discussion of the original justifications for the traditional offsetting doctrine, see 
supra Part I.E. 
 345. Karan, 70 A.3d at 535 (quoting State v. Miller, 23 N.J.L. 383, 385 (1852)). 
 346. See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text. 
 347. Karan, 70 A.3d at 535 (quoting Carson v. Coleman, 11 N.J. Eq. 106, 108 (Ch. 
1856)). 
 348. Id. at 536 (citing STOVER, supra note 125). 
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New Jersey court found that the concern over general benefits was 
generated by the speculative valuations of nineteenth-century railroads.349 
The court then discussed the difficulties of distinguishing between 
general and special benefits.350  The court criticized the inconsistent rules 
that had developed to define a benefit as special or general.351  The court 
specifically noted that some New Jersey cases defined general benefits as 
“speculative or conjectural,”352 while other cases used “benefits shared in 
common” with the community as a definition.353  The court found that “the 
terms special and general benefits do more to obscure than illuminate the 
basic principles governing the computation of just compensation in eminent 
domain cases.”354 
The New Jersey court then proceeded to compare a total taking to a 
partial taking.355  In the total taking context, courts compute compensation 
by considering anything that a buyer and seller would assess when 
purchasing a property.356  The court opined that buyers and sellers would 
not consider benefits that were “speculative or conjectural and that are not 
projected into the indefinite future.”357  Thus, in total-takings cases, courts 
play a gatekeeping role, ensuring that the jury does not hear speculative 
evidence.358  The court found that partial takings cases should be treated no 
differently.359  Thus, in New Jersey, any “reasonably calculable benefits,” 
those benefits that are not “speculative or conjectural,” can be considered 
when offsetting severance damages.360  It is irrelevant whether the benefit is 
peculiar to the particular property or enjoyed by the community as a 
whole.361 
Some public figures and attorneys hope that the new rule in New Jersey 
will reduce litigation.362  The general theory is that the existence of eminent 
domain should result in bargaining, and that eminent domain is rarely 
used.363  Because the landowners are aware that the entity has the power of 
eminent domain, they are incentivized to negotiate for a fair price rather 
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 357. Id. 
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 360. Id. at 543. 
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than hold out for a windfall profit.364  Along the New Jersey coastline, 
many residents elected to hold out despite eminent domain, believing that 
they could receive more compensation at trial.365  This belief was fueled by 
the strong possibility that the benefits of the sand dune would be deemed 
general, and thus would not offset a condemnation award.366  However, by 
permitting offsetting, it is more likely that property owners will settle 
before any litigation occurs.367 
IV.   A MODERN APPROACH:  
OFFSETTING ALL REASONABLY CERTAIN BENEFITS 
Part IV argues that both federal and state courts should offset benefits 
against condemnation awards regardless of arbitrary classifications.  
Part IV.A maintains that the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment permits 
the offsetting of general benefits against condemnation awards.  Part IV.B 
asserts that most state constitutions would similarly permit offsetting of 
general benefits.  Part IV.C argues that the old justifications for offsetting 
are outmoded.  Part IV.D contends the distinction between general and 
special benefits introduces unneeded complexity.  Lastly, Part IV.E 
discusses the public policy need for a new offsetting test in partial takings 
cases. 
A.   The Takings Clause Does Not Prohibit Offsetting of General Benefits 
From the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Bauman and Miller,368 it is 
fairly clear that while federal law presumes that only special benefits will 
offset,369 it is constitutionally permissible to offset any benefit.370 
Bauman does not hold that offsetting general benefits is 
unconstitutional.371  Instead, the case articulates that it is constitutionally 
 
 364. See id. at 169–71. But see id. at 164–69 (discussing the behavior of landowners 
when there is no threat of the use of eminent domain). 
 365. See Kate Zernikie, Trying to Shame Dune Holdouts at Jersey Shore, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 5, 2013, at A1 (discussing the 1000 holdouts who have refused dune construction on 
their property); see also Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 528 (N.J. 2013) 
(discussing the Karans’ decision to go to trial). 
 366. See supra Part I.E (discussing the traditional offsetting doctrine). 
 367. See Spoto, supra note 223; see also Christine Clolinger, NJ Court’s Holding Could 
Facilitate Shoreline Sand Dune Construction, 12 SANDBAR 10, 12 (2013) (“The government 
will likely no longer need to bring landowners to court to secure easements for sand dune 
construction.”). 
 368. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1942); Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897). 
 369. See supra notes 200–19 and accompanying text (discussing Bauman); supra notes 
220–24, 242–47 (discussing the current federal approach to offsetting and other court’s 
interpretations of Bauman). 
 370. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the Miller opinion’s assertion that any benefit may 
offset and the subsequent treatment of that assertion by the circuit courts); see also McCoy v. 
Union Elevated R.R. Co., 247 U.S. 354, 366 (1918) (leaving whether to offset benefits to the 
states). 
 371. See supra notes 214–15 and accompanying text (discussing the only sections of the 
Bauman opinion that even suggest that offsetting general benefits might be unconstitutional). 
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permissible to offset any benefit.372  The passages of the Bauman opinion 
that criticize the offsetting of general benefits373 merely assert policy 
reasons why jurisdictions might consider limited offsetting to special 
benefits.374  While opining that general benefits should not be 
considered,375 the court tacitly approves of offsetting general benefits by 
citing to authorities that approved of that practice.376 
As the Alabama Supreme Court has suggested,377 the U.S. Supreme 
Court has held that decisions regarding offsetting are left for the individual 
states to decide.378  This proposition appears tempered only by the proviso 
that the benefit must not be overly speculative, be it general or special.379  
In the Supreme Court’s last exposition on offsetting, the only limitation the 
Court placed on offsetting was that the taking had to have “in fact benefited 
the remainder.”380  The Court did not limit offsetting to special benefits, let 
alone discuss the special/general benefit dichotomy.381 
B.   State Constitutions Do Not Prohibit Offsetting of General Benefits 
Initially, if the United States Constitution did not prohibit offsetting it 
would follow that state constitutions must also not impose such a 
limitations.  The state constitutional provisions often mirror the identical 
language used in the Fifth Amendment’s Taking Clause.382  However, 
states have a sovereign right to interpret their constitutions to provide 
greater protection of private property.383  As is always the case, the U.S. 
Constitution is a floor, not a ceiling.384 
Despite this notion of federalism, nothing in the state constitutions or the 
historical context for the ratification of the state constitutions supports a 
 
 372. See supra notes 218–19 and accompanying text (discussing Bauman’s holding that 
offsetting is constitutionally permissible and the authorities the Court relied on to reach that 
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 373. See supra notes 216–17 and accompanying text. 
 374. See supra notes 220–21 and accompanying text (noting that Bauman relies on 
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 375. See Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 581 (1897). 
 376. See supra notes 208–13 (noting the acknowledgement and citation to cases that 
permitted the offsetting of general benefits). 
 377. See supra note 222–24 and accompanying text (discussing the Alabama Supreme 
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 383. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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Federal Floor and State Ceiling, 49 MO. L. REV 1 (1984). 
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finding that offsetting general benefits is unconstitutional.385  Instead, state 
courts that have determined that offsetting general benefits violates their 
state constitution, are actually misinterpreting their constitutions because of 
public policy concerns.386  States’ opinions on the subject always discuss 
fears of permitting the offsetting of remote, hypothetical, speculative, 
conjectural, or chimerical benefits.387  In fact, many state courts merely cite 
to sister state authorities for the proposition that only special benefits may 
offset a condemnation award.388 
The takeaway from the lack of a textual justification and reliance on 
policy concerns is that if states’ concerns about the speculative nature of 
general benefits were assuaged, no further justification would exist for 
prohibiting the offsetting of such benefits.389 
C.   The Justifications of the Traditional Offsetting Rule Are Outmoded 
1.   The Primary Role of Takings Is No Longer 
to Provide Land to Private Companies 
State courts’ concerns about general benefits being largely speculative 
reflect concerns of the nineteenth century.390  When the traditional 
offsetting doctrine was created, state courts may have been justifiably 
concerned about the speculative value of the projects of the industrial 
railroads.391  In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, takings were a 
powerful tool of private companies in desperate need of public subsidies for 
expansive development projects.392  It is clear that there were instances of 
abuse, including speculative valuations that allowed railroads to take land 
for free.393 
However, modern takings are largely conducted by government entities 
to facilitate large public projects.394  Takings no longer play the role of a 
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private subsidy supporting the projects of private companies who lobbied 
government officials aggressively for the right to use the power of eminent 
domain.395  Instead, the government conducts most takings and is 
accountable to the electorate. 
2.   Concern over the Speculative Nature 
of General Benefits Is Unwarranted 
The chief concern of courts that reject offsetting of general benefits is 
that the benefits are overly speculative.396  The problem with this argument 
is that it does not speak to general benefits at all but instead relates to a 
concern about the evidentiary standards required to prove valuation.397 
There is no support for the claim that general benefits are any more 
speculative than special benefits.398  Some state courts have recognized this, 
and they have redefined a general benefit to merely serve as a prohibition 
against “speculative” or “conjectural” benefits.399  A better solution is to 
simply permit the offsetting of any benefit,400 so long as its value can be 
substantially proven.401 
There is little reason to worry that courts and litigants will not be able to 
arrive at nonspeculative valuations of the benefit of takings projects.  First, 
litigants have access to a plethora of data regarding the value of properties 
in their area,402 and litigants could almost certainly find data on the value of 
similar properties that have benefited from a similar project.  Additionally, 
juries no longer deal in abstract properties and abstract projects.  
Frequently, juries are permitted to physically inspect a property, which can 
allow them to better understand the property in relation to the takings 
project.403  For example, if Town A wanted to take a portion of B’s 
oceanfront mansion, the jury could visit the mansion to observe the height 
and structure of the home as well as its proximity to the ocean.404  This 
would provide clarity by allowing the jury to evaluate any expert testimony 
offered on valuation. 
The availability of expert testimony in condemnation cases greatly 
reduces the risk of a speculative benefit offsetting a condemnation 
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award.405  Litigants and courts have access to experts that can testify both to 
the value before the taking, and the value of the property after the taking 
project is completed.406  Judges and juries are not bound to simply accept 
the direct testimony of an expert either.  Experts are subject to cross 
examination, and if the court is not satisfied with any expert opinion, it 
could appoint its own additional expert.407 
Under the rule proposed in this Note, the judge performs their traditional 
“gatekeeping” role throughout the litigation.408  The judge will only allow 
the jury to hear evidence that is sufficiently nonspeculative.409  In the event 
that a judge determines that all of the evidence offered concerning the 
benefits of a taking project is speculative, the jury will determine a 
condemnation award without considering the benefit.  This allows 
municipalities to offset any sufficiently proven benefits flowing from the 
taking and addresses the concerns of courts that general benefits are overly 
speculative.410 
3.   Double Payment Can Be Avoided by Reducing Offsets 
to Account for Taxation 
In addition to speculation, many courts root their distinction between 
general and special benefits in a theory that because a landowner’s 
condemnation award is offset by the benefits from the project and the 
landowner pays for the project in taxes, the landowner in effect double 
pays.411 
A landowner is entitled to just compensation and therefore cannot be 
required to pay for the gross value of an improvement.412  What this 
dictates is not that general benefits cannot offset a condemnation award, but 
that a landowner cannot be required to pay for the cost to produce the 
improvement.413  Courts that have suggested that offsetting general benefits 
results in double taxation can remedy this concern by further offsetting the 
condemnation award to account for assessments paid by landowners for the 
improvement. 
D.   Eliminating the Distinction Between General and Special Benefits 
Will Simplify the Judicial Process 
If courts eliminate the distinction between general and special benefits, 
they can focus on ensuring that the taking entity provides sufficient proof of 
the value of the offsetting benefit, rather than attempting to classify and 
offset based on indeterminate categories.  In fact, many cases may not even 
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reach the judiciary.  With a clear rule in place, many litigants reach 
settlements without needing to come to court.414 
Since the advent of the traditional offsetting doctrine, courts have 
experienced great confusion in determining whether benefits are general or 
special.415  The doctrine generated so much confusion that a Missouri state 
court noted that “trained legal minds have difficulty in distinguishing 
between the two types of benefits.”416  A Missouri court also described the 
distinction as “shadowy.”417  Naturally flowing from this confusion was 
pages of inconsistent decisions in state and federal reporters.418  Courts 
reached different decisions regarding the benefits flowing from railroads, 
highways, river channels, and telephone lines.419 
All of this confusion only served to obscure the central goal—just 
compensation.420  By eliminating the distinction, courts can focus on 
evaluating the evidence and ensuring that compensation is just, both to the 
landowner and the public.421 
E.   The Need for a New Partial Takings Approach 
If offsetting is constitutional—as this Note argues422—and largely a 
product of the nineteenth century—a different era with a different legal 
system—offsetting should be rejected because public policy concerns of the 
twenty-first century public are different.  Seas are rising,423 and 
municipalities, states, and the federal government’s options are limited.424  
One way to make implementing solutions easier is to ensure that federal 
and state partial condemnation law is fair to all parties involved.425 
Ultimately, fairness requires that courts render compensation that is just 
to the landowner and the public.426  If a landowner’s property sits directly 
on the coastline, is it just that his compensation is reduced, when the 
evidence shows that a sand dune project would save his home from certain 
destruction?  One thing that is certain, whatever benefit the dune project has 
on the property, is that the landowner will capture the value of that 
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enhanced benefit when the property is sold.427  In a circumstance where a 
landowner benefits from a project, as shown by the evidence, not permitting 
that benefit to offset a condemnation award acts as a subsidy to that 
particular landowner, which is paid by the rest of the community.428 
Instead, permitting all nonspeculative benefits to offset a partial 
condemnation award is fair to the landowners because they receive the 
benefits while living on the property, which they can sell in the future.429  
Under this rule, the other members of the community do not wholly 
subsidize the project, but instead pay their fair share in taxes,430 and the 
community members are not prevented from receiving the projections of the 
project because of a few holdouts.431 
CONCLUSION 
Developed in the nineteenth century, the traditional approach to 
offsetting in partial takings cases reflects nineteenth-century concerns and 
uses nineteenth-century valuation methods.  The special/general benefits 
dichotomy has paralyzed courts and litigants generating inconsistent 
opinion after inconsistent opinion.  Yet, the majority of state and the federal 
courts appear to continue to revere the doctrine as though it were laid out in 
the Bill of Rights. 
It is time for the courts to recognize that this judicially created distinction 
only serves to layer unneeded complexity on an already difficult question of 
just compensation.  Courts should reject this faux sophistication and follow 
a simplified rule that all reasonably certain benefits can offset a 
condemnation award in a partial takings case. 
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